Key Points
- A Berkshire Coroner’s Court jury found Matthew Trickett died by suicide on May 19, 2024.
- The jury found Serco staff failed to take reasonable steps to locate his address and fit his electronic tag.
- A bail breach notification was sent to Thames Valley Police after four unsuccessful installation attempts.
- The jury concluded the failed tagging process contributed to Mr Trickett bringing forward his suicide.
- Concerns were raised about electronic-monitoring systems and the protection of people released on bail or early release.
Maidenhead (East London Times) November 18, 2026 – Matthew Trickett, a former Royal Marine facing charges linked to alleged spying for Hong Kong, brought forward his suicide after Serco failed to locate his address and fit an electronic tag, an inquest jury has found. The 37-year-old was found dead in a park in Maidenhead, Berkshire, on May 19, 2024, shortly before a Crown Court hearing. The jury concluded that he died by hanging and that his death was suicide. It found that Serco’s failures led to a bail breach notification being sent to Thames Valley Police, which intensified Mr Trickett’s fear of being returned to custody.
- Key Points
- What did the inquest jury find about Matthew Trickett’s death?
- How did the electronic-tagging failures occur?
- What information was passed to police about his self-harm risk?
- What concerns did the coroner raise about electronic monitoring?
- What was the confirmed medical finding?
- Background: What led to the inquest?
- What could the findings mean for people subject to electronic monitoring?
What did the inquest jury find about Matthew Trickett’s death?
As reported by ITV News, the jury at Berkshire Coroner’s Court found that Mr Trickett had already planned to take his own life but brought the plan forward after learning that police were trying to locate him. His final letter to his family was dated May 23, although the jury heard that he changed the date to May 19 after the police contact.
The jury foreman said Mr Trickett feared being arrested and taken back into custody. He had previously attempted to harm himself while in police custody and had expressed an intention to take his own life after release. Westminster Magistrates’ Court granted bail two days after that incident, despite an application for him to be remanded for his own protection.
How did the electronic-tagging failures occur?
As reported by the Maidenhead Advertiser, Serco received Mr Trickett’s correct address on May 13, 2024, the day he was granted bail. Field staff attempted to fit the tag on May 14, 15, 16 and 18, but the equipment was never installed.
The inquest heard that staff may have attended the wrong block of flats. Notes from the first visit referred to door numbers ending at six, although Mr Trickett’s address identified flat 42. Serco did not attempt to obtain his telephone number, and there was no evidence that Mr Trickett refused entry or deliberately obstructed the visits.
After the fourth unsuccessful attempt, Serco sent Thames Valley Police a document headed “bail breach notification”. It gave the reason as “inability to monitor”. The jury found that the field operators had failed to take reasonable steps to locate the address.
What information was passed to police about his self-harm risk?
The inquest heard that information about Mr Trickett’s self-harm comments and an incident in custody was not passed to Thames Valley Police before his release. A senior officer said the details were recorded on paper rather than uploaded through a digital system, resulting in a failure to transfer the information.
The Metropolitan Police officer involved said the information sent to Thames Valley Police did not identify the custody incident or Mr Trickett’s comments about possible suicide or self-harm. The national security unit has since introduced a checklist intended to give senior investigating officers greater oversight when suspects leave custody.
What concerns did the coroner raise about electronic monitoring?
Senior Coroner Heidi Connor said Serco had not carried out an internal investigation into the failures, despite the matter occurring more than two years earlier. She also said simple online map searches conducted during the inquest showed how easily Mr Trickett’s home could be found.
Ms Connor warned that more people could die if Serco did not improve its systems for locating addresses and notifying authorities about problems. She noted that electronic tags would be required for dangerous offenders released under early-release arrangements.
The inquest also considered a joint inspectorate briefing that found only 55% of GPS and radio-frequency tags in a sample of 180 cases were fitted promptly. About one in five people waited more than two weeks for monitoring, while almost one in ten still had no equipment assigned up to five months after the requirement was imposed.
What was the confirmed medical finding?
Forensic pathologist Dr Robert Chapman concluded that Mr Trickett died by hanging. He found no evidence of assault by another person, restraint or natural disease. Dr Chapman said earlier intervention generally improved the chance of recovery, but that a delay was highly unlikely to have changed the outcome if Mr Trickett was already cold and unresponsive when he was found.
Background: What led to the inquest?
Matthew Trickett was a former Royal Marine and Home Office immigration officer who had served in the Arctic Circle, the Mediterranean, Brunei and Afghanistan. He was facing National Security Act allegations alongside two other men who were later jailed. He was released on bail with a curfew, reporting requirements and a condition that an electronic tag be fitted. He was found dead a week after his first magistrates’ court hearing in a park in Maidenhead, Berkshire.
What could the findings mean for people subject to electronic monitoring?
The findings could increase scrutiny of electronic-tagging contractors, particularly where failed installation attempts generate breach notifications against people already assessed as vulnerable. People released on bail or under early-release schemes may face greater checks on address verification, communication between police forces and recording of self-harm risks. The case may also encourage authorities to review whether contractors should contact the person directly before reporting an inability to monitor. For families and legal representatives, the inquest highlights the potential consequences when administrative failures, incomplete risk information and police intervention occur together.
